We analyze the linking and versioning strategies of a media publisher when facing competition from blogs, search engines and news aggregators. We show that when the publisher competes against a blog it is less likely to release a "…ghting version" if this generates signi…cant spillovers for its competitor. When the publisher competes against a search engine, it wants to be linked when it receives enough indirect tra¢ c from it, and in this case it uses the search engine as its own low quality version. We also demonstrate that when the publisher is integrated with a search engine it might link other publishers to obtain more indirect visitors if the contents are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated.
Introduction
The newspaper industry is undergoing a major transformation. 1 Internet has signi…cantly reduced the costs of accessing information and of distributing the contents globally and this has favoured the creation of many news services that compete with traditional newspapers.
In this new scenario, publishers seek out new competitive strategies and business models to retain consumers and advertisers. This paper analyzes how the changes in the industry are modifying the linking and versioning strategies of media publishers.
Some of the most successful new players in the media market are search engines and news aggregators, which have risen to occupy the top positions in audience ranking (Nielsen 2011).
Search engines link the pieces of news of other on line newspapers and display them in a single site accompanied by a title or an excerpt. This represents a considerable saving to consumers in terms of time and e¤ort as they can simultaneously check several information sources for updates. 2 Search engines use algorithms that index and group stories according to diverse criteria including the originality of information, their immediate interest for readers and their "contagious" capacity. News search engines such as Google News, Bing News, and Summify neither hang advertisements nor set user charges. Their commercial objective is essentially to bring visitors to other Internet services on the same platform, such as common searches that sell advertising space or social platforms.
News aggregators, by contrast, provide news articles that are created with information obtained from newspapers and press agencies, and they do not usually include links to the original sources. Some of the best known aggregators are Yahoo! News, Drudge Report, and
The Hu¢ ngton Post. These usually reach licensing agreements with information suppliers to avoid copyright infringements.
The emergence of these new services has created a trade-o¤ for traditional newspapers, who must decide between …ghting the entrants or accommodating them. On the one hand, entrants create a business-stealing e¤ect since they use information from traditional newspapers 1 Figures for 2002 show that the newspaper industry amounted to around $50 billion business and employed around 400,000 people. However, today it is facing a severe crisis in part due to the migration of readers from printed newspapers to on-line news sources (PEJ, 2011). 2 According to this argument, U.S. legislation considers that these entrants make a "transformative" use of contents and, as a consequence, do not infringe copyright law (Isbell, 2010) .
to create their own contents and attact visitors. 3 On the other hand, they create a market expansion e¤ect because they reduce consumer search costs by making great variety of contents widely available from one single web site. This situation bene…ts traditional newspapers, which receive indirect tra¢ c from the visitors of the search engines that click their links. 4 The relationship between search engines and news agencies is even more complex, because the main activity of agencies is precisely that of feeding newspapers with their content. In order to deal with this situation, in 2004 Google News reached an agreement with the Associated Press (AP), permitting Google to host AP contents in exchange for compensation. 5 Similarly, in 2005 Agence France Press (AFP) …led a lawsuit against Google News for removal of copyright management information and "hot news"misappropriation. After two years of litigation, AFP
and Google News settled the case by signing a licensing agreement, according to which Google was granted the right to post AFP content. In spite of this, other press associations are still pressing public authorities to protect their content, 6 and some regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission have suggested various solutions to deal with this problem, which range from extending copyright legislation to diverse antitrust exemptions for news organizations (FTC, 2010) .
Traditional newspapers have modi…ed their commercial strategies to defend themselves against new competitors. Some publishers believe that they still have a signi…cant demand from readers who prize high quality journalism, editorial guidance and the opinions of experts.
Thus, for example, The Times launched a pay wall in 2010 and The Wall Street Journal has 3 Some traditional newspapers consider aggregators to be free-riders reselling the information they have gathered at vast expense (Frijters and Velamuri, 2010). R. Murdoch has declared: "To aggregate stories is not fair use. To be impolite, it is theft". See The Guardian, 1/12/2009, "There's no such thing as a free news story", http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/dec/01/rupert-murdoch-no-free-news. 4 Evidence suggests that 44% of Google News! users in 2010 didn't click through to the original articles. recently launched "freemium", by which general news remain free but premium contents and some blogs are locked behind a pay wall. Similarly, the Financial Times o¤ers subscriptions to premium and standard articles at di¤erent prices. 7 Some publishers have tried to increase their audiences by buying news aggregators. For example, in 2005 Gannet bought Topix.net, and in 2011 AOL bought The Hu¢ ngton Post. Other publishers have even created their own news aggregators with high quality contents. 8 The objective of this paper is to analyze how new business models in the media market are modifying the commercial strategy of media publishers. We present a model that examines the linking and versioning strategies of one publisher that can compete with one blog, search engine or news aggregator. By so doing, we identify when it wants to …ght the entrant by releasing a low quality version and when it prefers to accept the links of the search engine. We
show that links allow the publishers to use the web sites of their competitors as an alternative distribution channel for their contents.
Our paper contributes to the recent literature that analyzes the impact of news aggregators in the managerial strategies of publishers. Katona and Sarvary (2008) were the …rst to theoretically analyze strategic linking between web sites in a market for advertising links. examine how search technology and aggregators can alter both market participation and the number of sites visited. They explain that both aggregators and improved search technology tend to increase viewer multi-homing. But unlike search, aggregators may not expand the market. Jeon and Nasr (2012) show how the presence of a news aggregator a¤ects competition among newspapers. They …nd that competition with a news aggregator can lead to the specialization of newspapers when their advertising revenue increases substantially with an increase in quality. With specialization, the presence of the aggregator increases the average quality of newspapers, which in turn increases consumer surplus.
Our paper also contributes to the economic literature on versioning. The seminal papers of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Moorthy (1984) showed that the introduction of a new version by a monopolist might be pro…table when the bene…ts of expanding the market overcome the cannibalization e¤ect on the original product. Stokey (1979) and Salant (1989) later showed that versioning essentially depends on the form of the cost function. In particular, versioning is optimal when the marginal cost function of improving the quality is su¢ ciently convex.
More recently, a number of papers have sought to clarify the circumstances under which versioning is convenient for a monopolist. Bhargava and Choundary (2008) …nd that versioning depends on the relation between the optimal market share of the low and high quality versions of one product when they are o¤ered alone. Anderson and Dana (2009) show that versioning requires that the relative change in overall surplus associated with a product quality improvement is increasing in consumers' willingness to pay. Calzada and Valletti (2012) demonstrate that versioning might arise when consumers are allowed to buy two versions of the same product. They examine the particular case of the movie industry and explain that versioning is optimal when the theater and the DVD versions are not merely substitutes. In this case, while some consumers buy both versions, others only use the theater or the DVD version. This situation is closely related to that discussed here, since the main characteristic of news aggregators is to allow reading the contents of several newspapers.
Other studies have analyzed versioning in the presence of competition. Wu, Chen and Anandalingam (2003) show that versioning can be a very e¤ective and pro…table instrument in the …ght against piracy. 9 Valletti and Szymanski (2006) analyze parallel trade for products 9 An early analysis on this issue can be found in Johson and Myatt (2003) .
protected by intellectual property rights such as the export of pharmaceuticals. They show that pharmaceutical …rms only …nd it optimal to release a lower quality version when they compete with a generic product. Our paper is related to their model, since we analyze the versioning strategy of a publisher who faces competition from other sites. A remarkable di¤erence is, however, that the contents distributed by publishers through Internet can be immediately used by other news sites and can be linked. We show that these situations can modify importantly the versioning strategy of …rms.
Our paper extends the traditional models of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Moorthy and Png (1992) to examine the versioning policy of a publisher that competes with other news sites.
The publisher can commercialize two news sites of di¤erent qualities and/or di¤erent editorial approaches, as is the case of the News Corporation or The New York Times Co. 10 Taking this
into account, we …rst analyze the e¤ects of the entry of a blog (or a news site) that uses the information released by the publisher to generate its own contents, but that doesn't set links to the original sources of information. We show that a competitor of this type reduces the publisher's incentives to release a second news site. While in Valletti and Szymanski (2006) the incumbent release a "…ghting version"to defend itself against the competitor, in our model the …ghting version generates positive spillovers that increases the quality of the competitor.
As a result, it is more likely that the publisher accommodates the blog instead of releasing a second version.
The second part of the paper analyzes the case when the publisher competes against a search engine. The search engine bene…ts from the news sites of the publisher when it links them. We show that the publisher accepts the links of the search engine when it receives su¢ cient indirect tra¢ c from it. The reason is that the link can generate more revenues than a low quality version. In fact, for the publisher the link plays a similar role than a low quality version. When the indirect tra¢ c generated by the link is even higher the publisher accepts the links but releases a second version in order to expand the audience of the search engine.
Although the new version cannivalizes its high quality news site it generates enough indirect tra¢ c to compensate this e¤ect. As in Calzada and Valletti (2012) , the publisher releases two versions because some consumers buy both of them. Finally, we examine the case where the 1 0 Alternatively, we could think in one newspaper that commercializes high and low quality pieces of news that cover the same event, as in the freemium pricing model. quality of the search engine can be higher than the quality of the news sites o¤ered by the publisher, and we show that in this case linking and versioning are more likely.
The last part of the paper considers an integrated publisher that owns a newspaper and a search engine. We explain that the publisher can be interested in linking its competitors when their news sites are su¢ ciently complementary and the indirect tra¢ c generated by the search engine is not too high. We also show that the publisher can maintain the search engine active but without links to its competitors because it constitutes a pro…table distribution channel.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes the versioning strategy of a publisher that competes with a blog. Section 4 examines the linking and versioning strategies of a publisher that competes with a high and a low quality search engine. Section 5 considers an integrated publisher that owns a news site and a search engine. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We analyze the versioning and linking strategies of a publisher that can have di¤erent competitors such as a blog, a search engine or a news aggregator. The publisher can o¤er one or two on line newspapers with di¤erent editorial approaches. It always o¤ers the news site H of quality u H = u and it might also release the site L of a quality u L = u; where < 1. This occurs when consumers prefer contrasting the information of several news sites than visiting just one newspaper with a particular editorial policy.
In order to simplify the model and to make it more realistic we assume that the consumers' searching costs are so high that they can only visit one site (the anchor site). In spite of this, willingness to pay. Taking this into account, the consumers' net utility when they visit the publisher's version i is u i p i , with i 2 fH; L; Ag, where p i is the price of the news sites or the consumers'costs when they visit the entrant. An alternative way of interpreting our model is to imagine that p i is the number of advertisements inserted on the news site i when the price of the advertisements is exogenously set and normalized to one. Under this interpretation the publisher would choose the number of advertisements that maximizes its pro…ts, taking into account that advertisements reduce the utility of consumers.
Finally, in order to focus our attention on the …rm's linking and versioning strategy, we assume that the costs associated with producing each version are sunk, and that the marginal costs of the versions are zero. This assumption means that it could be expensive to generate contents for the newspapers, but that they can be distributed at no cost through the Internet.
Competing with blogs: no exclusion option
This section examines the commercial policy of a publisher competing with a blog, or a news site using third party content. Internet allows bloggers to publish opinions and pieces of news that are largely based on information produced by traditional on line newspapers. As a result, when a publisher releases new contents it feeds these sites with materials that improve their quality. In this section, we assume that the publisher is not able to prevent the use of its contents by others, as it happens with bloggers.
The following set of indi¤erent consumers describes the segmentation of consumers under 
. In this section, we assume for simplicity that u L > u A , which means that the quality of the blog can never be larger than the quality of L.
The timing of the game played by the publisher and the blog is as follows: …rst, the publisher decides how many versions it o¤ers; second, it sets the prices and releases its news sites; third, the blog creates its own contents using the information generated by the publisher.
Finally, consumers choose their preferred news site.
The following proposition shows when the publisher only releases H and accommodates the blog, and when it releases a …ghting version. It also describes the resulting segmentation of the consumers.
Proposition 1.
In the presence of a blog the publisher reacts as follows: 1) If < 1 its optimal versioning strategy is:
When 0 s b s, the …rm only o¤ ers H, and the blog is active; When b s < s 1, the …rm supplies H and L, and the blog is active;
2) If 1 its optimal versioning strategy is:
When 0 s s 2 , the …rm only supplies H, and the blog is active; When s 2 < s s 1 , the …rm supplies H and L; but the blog is not active;
When s 1 < s 1; the …rm supplies H and L, and the blog is active;
Proof. See the Appendix. The second part of the proposition considers the case where A and L have similar qualities
The intuition of the result is the same than before, but now when s takes an intermediate value (s 2 < s s 1 ) the publisher sets a low p L and A fails to attract consumers (region B Panell II in Figure 1 ).
This proposition can be directly related to the model of Valletti and Szymanski (2006) who
show that under the presence of a competitor an incumbent will release a …ghting brand to retain part of its pro…ts. Proposition 1 reaches the same conclusion when s is close to 1, that is, when the blog gains few spillovers from the …ghting newspaper. However, when the new site strengthens signi…cantly the blog, the publisher only o¤ers H.
The model reveals that the publisher's versioning strategy depends on the externalities generated by L. The next result shows that when the publisher releases L it would prefer to o¤er a close substitute to H in order to minimize the spillover e¤ect. Proof. See the Appendix.
The key element to understand this result is that consumers can only access the information o¤ered in both H and L when they visit the blog. In fact, the publisher doesn't has any site that aggregates the contents of the versions and for this reason it can not bene…t of their complementarity. For this reason, it if was able to determine the quality of L it will just create a degraded version of H (i.e. s ! 1). For example, L could summarize the main information in H or could reproduce part of the contents. The reduction of s reduces the utility of A and allows the publisher to increase its prices. In spite of this, some switch from A to L.
The main result of this section has been to show that when publishers can't avoid its contents being used by others versioning is less likely than what was previously considered in the literature. The reason is that a …ghting versions improves the quality of the blog. In spite of this, if the publisher was able to control the use of its contents it could also accomodate the entrant in exchange of an appropiate compensation. This is the case of several publishers and news agencies such as Reuters, BBC News, or USA Today which have reached an agreement with Yahoo! News. In this case, the negotiation gives the publishers the possibility of internalizing the complementarity generated by their versions. 11 The next section examines an alternative mechanism that allows the publisher to bene…t of the complementarity between the versions, which is the establishment of links in the aggregators'web sites.
Competing with search engines: spillovers and links
Next we extend our model to examine the versioning strategy of a publisher that competes against a search engine. Imagine that the publisher can release one or two newspapers and that the search engine can link them in its web site. The visitors of the search engine read the headlines of the news articles (or excerpts of them) and click through to them with a probability , which we assume to be the same for H and L. For example, = 1 means that the visitors of the search engine always click the links and generate indirect tra¢ c for the publisher, and = 0 means that they read the headlines but never click through to any news articles.
Both the publisher and the search engine must agree in the establishment of the links. The publisher will accept the links to its newspaper if this increases its pro…ts; and the search engine links the newspapers if this increases its audience. We consider that consumers'searching costs are so high that the search engine is the only available mechanism for accessing the contents of two newspapers. In fact, the main feature of search engines is that they aggregate and classify the contents of several newspapers and reduce consumers'searching cost.
The quality of the search engine's site, which we call A, depends on the links that it contains. When it reaches an agreement with the publisher its quality is u A = u if the publisher releases H and u A = u[ + (1 s)] if the publisher releases both H and L. Contrary, when there is no agreement its quality is u A = ur; with r < . This implies that consumers value A less than L when the search engine doesn't link the publisher.
Taking this into account, the net utility of consumers that directly visit H is u p H and that of those who directly visit L is u p L . The net utility of consumers that visit A when
when it links H is u p H , and when it doesn't link any newspaper is ur p A . Notice that the search engine consumers only pay for the contents when they click through to the links. This re ‡ects the present situation of some search engines like Google News!, which neither charge any price to consumers nor include advertisements in their sites.
When the search engine links H and L it has a quality that can be higher or lower than those of H, depending on the complementarity between H and L. To account for this possibility,
we …rst analyze the case of a low quality search engine (u H > u L > u A ) and afterwards we examine the case of a high quality one (u A > u H > u L ). 12 The following proposition describes the linking and versioning strategies of a publisher that compete with a low quality search engine. This is the case where users derive greater utility from directly accessing one news site than from visiting one search engine that links several news sites (e.g. they like the editorial policy of the newspapers and value their reputation).
The timing of the game is as follows: …rst, the publisher decides how many versions to release; second, the publisher and the search engine negotiate about setting links on the publisher's sites, and taking into account the results of the negotiation the publisher set the prices; and third, the news sites are released and consumers choose their preferred service.
Proposition 2. The linking and versioning strategies of a publisher and a low quality search engine ( s > = ) are: The existence and size of these intervals depend on s.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The …rst part of the proposition shows that the publisher doesn't accept to be linked when it receives a small amount of tra¢ c from the search engine (0 < 1 ). In spite of this, the publisher releases the …ghting version L because it doesn't create spillovers on A (region A in the two Panels of Figure 2 ). As a consequence, there is a complete market segmentation of 1 2 We omit the case where u H > u A > u L for simplicity. In regions C the publisher is linked and releases H and L: In region D the publisher is linked and releases H. Finally, in region E the search engine doesn't want to link the publisher.
consumers: lowest-type consumers do not visit any site and the rest of consumers visit H, L or A according to their preference for quality. It is interesting to mention that 1 is increasing in p A , which means that when the search engine becomes more unattractive to consumers the publisher is less interested in reaching an agreement with it. Regarding the search engine, in this interval it wants to link the H and L. Indeed, although this implies an increase in its price
(p H + p L ) the increase in quality would compensate this situation and it will attract more visitors.
The second and third parts of the proposition show that when the publisher receives a larger amount of tra¢ c from the search engine it accepts to be linked and uses A as its own low quality version. If 1 < 2 , the publisher only releases H. If it also releases L this would generate positive spillovers on A that would reduce its pro…ts. Particularly, when and s are small the market expansion e¤ect generated by L does not compensate the cannibalization e¤ect on H. 13 Note that in this interval the link of H transforms A in the low quality version 1 3 If s is close to 1 the publisher always releases L and region B vanishes (see Panel I in Figure 2 ). of the publisher. Thus, the publisher prefers to accept the link and to use A as an alternative distribution channel for H than to release L. Finally, when is su¢ ciently large ( 4 < 1) the search engine never links the publisher.
The links would increase importantly its price and reduce its audience. In this case, consumers are segmented as in the …rst part of the proposition (see region E).
In our model the complementarity between H and L plays a key role in the strategy of the …rms, but it is introduced exogenously. The following result considers how the publisher would set s once it o¤ers the two versions and these are linked.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the publisher releases H and L and that these are linked by a low quality search engine. If the cost of horizontally di¤ erentiate L from H is c(s) = 1=ks, then the publisher will choose the lowest possible level of product di¤ erentiation, s = 1.
Therefore, even when the publisher accommodates the search engine and releases the two newspapers it prefers to increase s in order to reduce spillovers as much as possible.
The strategy of the publisher changes signi…cantly when the quality of the search engine is larger than the quality of H and L consumed separately, u A > u H > u L . This situation re ‡ects the case where consumers prefer product variety to limiting themselves to one high quality newspaper. The following proposition describes the commercial strategy of …rms in this situation.
Proposition 3. The linking and versioning strategy when the publisher competes against a high quality search engine ( s < ( + 1)= ) is: 3. If 2 < 1, the publiser releases H and L, but either the search engine (for 2 <
3 ) or both …rms (for 3 < ) are not interested in the links.
The …rst part of the proposition focuses on the case in which is small (0 1 ). In such a situation, the publisher releases H and L and allows the links of the search engine. As is small and u A u H only A receives direct visitors. In spite of this, the publisher maximizes pro…ts with this segmentation of the market because it can set high prices for the two services.
Indeed, it obtains more pro…ts that if it was a monopolist. Hence, the presence of one search engine that aggregates contents makes both …rms better o¤ because consumers indirectly visit both H and L.
The second part of the proposition shows that when the users of the search engine make more visits to the newspapers ( 1 < 2 ) prices become too high for some consumers to visit the two versions. The last part of the proposition presents the case for the highest values of ( 2 < 1).
In this case, both …rms lose incentives to reach an agreement. When > 2 the high price of A will o¤set the increase in the quality of A generated with the links. As a result, the search engine prefers not to link the publisher. To illustrate this situation, imagine that s = 1 To address this case, we next analyze the linking and versioning strategy of a vertically integrated publisher that commercializes both a high quality newspaper H and an aggregator A. 15 The publisher competes with an independent publisher that o¤ers a low-quality newspaper L. For simplicity, we assume that the price of the independent publisher, p L , is set exogenously.
The integrated and the independent publisher can agree to link L. When this happens, the level of complementarity between H and L determines the quality of A. When H and L are close substitutes A becomes a low quality search engine and when their contents are more complementary A is transformed in a high quality aggregator. Notice that the quality of the aggregator in ‡uences the strategies of the …rms. Indeed, in the …rst case we obtain that u H > u L > u A which means that the independent publisher has a stronger competitor "from below", and in the later case the link implies that u A > u H > u L which means that H has a competitor "from above".
The next proposition analyzes the linking strategies of the publishers when the contents are close substitutes. The timing of the game is as follows: …rst, the two publishers negotiate about setting a link to L; once they have taken a decision the integrated publisher sets p H ; and …nally consumers decide which news site to visit.
Proposition 4. The linking strategy of an integrated and an independent publisher that commercializes close substitute contents ( s > = ) is:
1. When = < s b s, the integrated publisher wants to link L when < 1 whereas the independent publisher is never interested.
2. When b s < s 1, the integrated publisher wants to link L when < 2 whereas the independent publisher wants when > 3 . Only when > there is a small region A depends on the relation between and s. In the case of the independent publisher, the pro…tability of the link depends on two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, the link generates a market expansion e¤ect because all the visitors of A click through to L with probability . On the other hand, it creates a cannibalization e¤ect, because A competes with L from below and it reduces part of its direct. visitors. Only when and s are su¢ ciently high the …rst e¤ect compensates the second and the publisher accepts the link
The …rst part of the proposition shows that when s is small (s < b s) the integrated publisher wants to link L if < 1 but its competitor is not interested because the cannibalization over L is too important (Figure 4 ). The second part shows that when s is large (s > b s) the integrated publisher wants to link L when is small ( < 2 ) and that it becomes less and less interested as s increases. Indeed, for larger values of and s the …rm has to reduce signi…cantly p H in order to generate a market expansion e¤ect. On the other hand, the independent publisher wants to be linked when is su¢ ciently large and becomes more and more interested in the agreement as s increases. Taking this into account, only in the small region 3 < 2 the two publishers agree on linking L, but this region only exists when is close to . The linking strategies of the …rms described above determine the segmentation of consumers, which is characterized below.
Corollary 4.
In the presence of an integrated and an independent publisher that commercialize close substitutes contents ( s > = ) consumers are segmented as follows:
1. When = < s b s and < the news sites H; L;and A receive direct visits and A links H. For A is not active.
2. When b s < s 1 and < the news sites H; L;and A receive direct visits and A links H, except when > , in which case it links both H and L in the interval 3 < < 2 :
For A is not active.
Proof. See Proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix.
The …rst part of the corollary shows that for < the integrated publisher maintains A active as a low quality version because this generates indirect visitors. But for the price of A, p H ; is too high and it would receive few visitors. For this reason, the publisher eliminates it and sets a higher p H . The second part of the corollary presents the same results, but as we have seen before in Proposition 4 in the interval 3 < < 2 the …rms reach an agreement and the search engine links both H and L.
The main insight of these results is that an integrated publisher might maintain active its low quality search engine, even when it doesn't link other sites. The search engine is used like a …ghting version, although in this case the publisher can only use p H to implement its strategy.
Next we examine the strategies of the …rms in the case of a high quality search engine.
Recall that in this case the linking decisions of the …rms can change importantly since the link implies that A competes with H "from above". The timing of the model is as before.
Proposition 5. The linking strategy of an integrated and an independent publisher that o¤ er complementary contents ( s < + 1 ) is:
1. When 0 s < e s, the integrated publisher wants to link L when 0 < 1 , whereas the independent publisher always wants to be linked.
2. When e s < s + 1 , the integrated publisher is never interested in linking L, whereas the independent publisher always wants to be linked.
As in Proposition 4 these results show that the integrated publisher only links L when both s and are small. When this occurs, it creates a high quality news aggregator that completely cannibalizes H (p H is so high that nobody directly visits H) and that directly competes with L. The market expansion e¤ect of A compensates the cannivalization e¤ect on H as long as
For larger values of the publisher doesn't link L because the search engine would become more expensive and it would need to reduce p H signi…cantly in order to maintain its market share. On the other hand, contrary to what happens in Proposition 4, the independent publisher always want to be linked: although A directly competes with L from above, it obtains many indirect consumers that compensate this e¤ect.
The second part of the proposition shows that for higher values of s the market expansion e¤ect generated when A links L does not compensate the cannibalization e¤ect on H. Again, in order to incentive consumers to switch from L to A the …rm would need to reduce signi…cantly p H , which is not pro…table.
The proposition shows that the integrated publisher only wants to link its competitor when s is small and it obtains a signi…cant increase in the market share of A. And when this happens the independent publisher can accept to be linked because this expands its market share with indirect visitors. Finally, we examine how the linking decisions of …rms in ‡uence consumers'segmentation. 
Conclusions
In recent years, blogs, search engines, and news aggregators have reached the top positions in audience ranking of news sites. While traditional publishers accuse these news sites of "stealing' their contents and revenues, entrants argue that they are in fact "expanding the market' by improving accessibility to newspapers and their contents. The reason for this is that they reduce consumer search costs by o¤ering links to many news sites and/or by editing the contents originated by other …rms. In this paper we have examined the product line response of publishers to this type of entrants.
Our …rst contribution has been to show that when publishers can't avoid its contents being used by others versioning is less likely than what was previously considered in the literature.
The reason is that …ghting versions improve the quality of competitors. We have also ana-lyzed the linking and versioning strategies of a publisher in competition with a search engine.
We have demonstrated that the publisher can accept to be linked when it receives su¢ cient tra¢ c from the search engine. When this occurs, the search engine becomes an additional distribution channel of the publisher that helps to weaken the e¤ects of competition. In the case of an integrated publisher, the search engine can set links to its competitor to bene…t of the complementarity of the contents and increase its audience. To the best of our knowledge, News generate signi…cant indirect tra¢ c, but it is still unclear which publishers are bene…ting of search engines and how they adjust their marketing strategies to accomodate them. 16 Our analysis can be extended in several directions in order to understand recent developments in the media market. Here, we have focused on the optimal versioning strategy of a publisher that can create news sites of di¤erent qualities; however, it would be interesting to study how publishers accept the links to some pieces of news to attract visitors to their web sites and to promote their premium contents (freemium model). 17 On the other hand, our model could be extended to examine the role of news agencies in the media market. As the recent con ‡icts between Google News and some press associations illustrates, news agencies provide fundamental information to traditional newspapers and they are very concerned about their use by news aggregators. and as a result the price and the pro…ts are:
With this price, it is veri…ed that HA = 1 2 1
To ensure the participation of the blog we consider that this condition is always satis…ed.
Imagine now that the publisher releases H and L. In this case, the indi¤erent types are
Solving the …rm's problem we obtain:
HLA(HL)
To ensure the participation of the blog now we need that s > s 1 =
If this is satis…ed, we obtain that HL =
On the other hand, when s 6 s 1 the ranking is not preserved and the publisher sets
to ensure that LA = A0 = L0 . Taking this into account, it sets p H to maximize HLA(HL) =
). The prices and the associated pro…t are:
Moreover, the indi¤erent types are: HL = 
Consider now the case for s < s 1 . If the …rm o¤ers the two versions the relevant prices and pro…t functions are those in (5) and (6), respectively. In this case, we obtain that HLA(HL) >
HA(H) for s > s 2 , where
Hence, for s 2 < s < s 1 the publisher o¤ers the two versions and the blog is not active. And for s < s 2 it only releases H and the blog is active.Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the pro…t function of the publisher in (4) when it releases the two versions and the cost of di¤erentiation is c(s) = 1=ks: For s > s 1 the three news sites have positive market share and the publisher's pro…t is:
The FOC of HLA(HL) with respect to s is
This expression can only be negative if p 2 A > ( u su) 2 , which happens for s 2
In spite of this, notice that s 1 > u +p A u for p A > 0. Therefore, it must be that
Finally, for s s 1 the publisher sets the prices in (5) and the pro…ts are those in (6) .
Taking this into account, the FOC of the pro…t with respect to s is:
A su¢ cient condition for this to be positive is u [ (1 s) + ] > 2p A . This is always satis…ed
, which has been previously assumed.Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Imagine that the publisher releases both H and L and that these are not linked by the search engine. In this case, the consumer indi¤erent to H and L is
which yields the following prices and pro…ts:
Moreover, the audience for the search engine is
Notice that the publisher always releases L since in this case it doesn't create spillovers on
A.
18 On the other hand, with the above prices we obtain HL =
r , which we assume for simplicity. Imagine next that the publisher only releases H and that this is linked by the search engine. In this case, the consumer indi¤erent to H and A is HA = p H (1 )=u(1 ), and the indi¤erent to A and not visiting any site is HA = p H =u . Taking this into account, the publisher sets p H to maximize HA(H) = p H (1 HA ) + p H ( HA A0 ). As a result, the price and the pro…ts are:
Moreover, the search engine's audience is A HA(H) = HA A0 = 2( 2 + 2 ) and it is satis…ed that HA =
When the publisher o¤ers both H and L and these are linked the consumer indi¤erent to H : It can be veri…ed that HLA > HA for p A > 0:
), and the indi¤erent to A and not visiting any site is
). The solution of its problem is:
With these prices we observe that
, and
This implies that the publisher can't get a positive market share for the two news sites. As an alternative, for < b the publisher can set
to guarantee that HL = LA = HLA ; where now HLA is the consumer indi¤erent between visiting H and visiting A when this links H and L. Taking this into account, the …rm sets
). The price and the associated pro…ts are:
The audience for the search engine is A HLA = HLA A0 , where:
It can be checked that now HLA > A0 for < b . On the other hand, for b < < the publisher sets
to guarantee that HLA = A0 = HLA0 , where HLA0 is the consumer indi¤erent between H and not visiting any site when the publisher also releases L at p L and the price of A is (p H + p L ). As a result, the publisher maximizes 
Now compare these results with those that will obtain the publisher if it o¤ers H and this is linked. First, observe that in the interval 2 h 0; b 1 there is 1 such that HLA > HA(H)
for < 1 and HA(H) HLA for 1 . The value for 1 is:
Next, it is veri…ed that in the interval 2 The expression for 3 is long and we don't present it 22 , and the expression for 4 is:
Recall that for b if two versions are released and linked p H is high and nobody visits A. Proof of Proposition 3. When the publisher and the search engine don't reach an agreement, the publisher releases H and L and its prices and pro…ts HLA are those in (10) .
On the other hand, if only H is released and it is linked then p H and HA(H) are those in (11) .
Consider next that the publisher releases H and L and that the …rms reach an agreement.
As a result, u A > u H because u A = u[ + (1 s)] and s < ( + 1)= . In this case, the
and L0 = p L =u . The …rm sets the prices p H and p L to maximize A(HL)
). Taking this into account, the prices and the associated pro…ts are:
A(HL)HL =
With these prices, the audience for the search engine is A A(HL)HL = 1 AH . Moreover, it is guaranteed that AH > HL > L0 as long as > 1 , where 1 = [ + (1 s)]=(1 + ): 2 4 The expression for 1 is the same than in the proof of Proposition 2. Indeed, this is the value of for which the three indiferent types are the same, which has to be the same in the two propositions. 2 5 Recall from the prof of Proposition 2 that for 1 it is satis…ed that HLA HA(H) and 1 3 holds if r < r, which is assumed.
). This yields:
A(HL) Proof of Corollary 3. The proof of Proposition 3 has shown that in the interval 1 < 2 the publisher releases the two versions and that these are linked by the search engine.
Taking into account the pro…ts in (14) and the costs c(s) = 1 ks the FOC of the pro…t with respect to s is:
De…ne s as the value of s that satis…es @ A(HL)HL 1 ks =@s = 0. The expression for s is not shown for simplicity but it can be shown that @ A(HL)HL 1 ks =@s > 0 for s < s and that s is a decreasing function of k. Taking this into account, we can de…ne k such that if k < k then s > ( + 1) and k > k such that s < + (1+ ) , where:
2 6 When p A ! 0 then A HLA ! A A(HL) = 1=2 and as a consequence 2 ! 1 . Graphically, this implies that in Figure 3 region B vanishes. 2 7 Note that s < + (1+ ) is equivalent to < 1 . Hence, it de…nes the domain of our analysis.
Suppose now that < 1 and therefore s 2 h 0; + (1+ ) . In this case the publisher sets the prices in (17) and obtains the pro…ts in (18) . Taking this into account and the cost function, we …nd that the FOC of the pro…t with respecto to s is:
It is easy to see that, @ A(HL)
. Moreover, as s is decreasing in k we can …nd a value k such that when k < k then s > + (1+ ) so the publisher always wants a high degree of di¤erentiation. Oppositely, when k ! 1 then s ! 0 and the publisher always wants the versions to be perfect substitutes. Finally, one can show that k = k.Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider …rst the case where the integrated publisher doesn't link L. The consumer in- 
With this price it holds that:
In order to ensure the participation of the independent publisher we assume
. 28 Note that the above prices are valid as long as HL > LA > A0 . However, for b 1 we …nd that A0 LA , where
Therefore, when b 1 A doesn't receive visits and the relevant indi¤erent consumers are
and L0 = p L =u . In this case, the pro…ts are
Solving for p H yields:
With this price it is satis…ed that
Therefore, the integrated publisher o¤ers A for < and it eliminates it otherwise.
Consider now the case where the aggregator links L. The quality of A is
and the indi¤erent types are
) and the pro…t of the independent publisher is 2
. Solving the problem yields: We don't show 2 HLA(HL) for simplicity. The price in (25) implies that:
The relation HL > LA > A0 is satis…ed for < b 2 (we don't show b 2 because it is a long expression). When b 2 it holds that LA A0 so nobody visits A. In this case, the independent publisher sets the price in (23) and obtains the pro…ts in (24) .
Next, we examine the linking strategy of both publishers taking into account the pro…t functions de…ned above. In the case of the integrated publisher, notice that in the interval To examine the preferences of the independent publisher we de…ne as 3 the values of for which 2 HLA(H) = 2 HLA(HL) . In the space f ; sg this de…nes a set of parameter combinations for which 2 HLA(HL) 2 HLA(H) . In the rest of cases the publisher don't accept to be linked. Finally, we identify in which situations the two publishers will reach an agreement over L. When > it can be shown that 2 intersects 3 twice in the f ; sg space: call these The pro…ts of the independent publisher 2 A(HL)HL are not shown for simplicity. The price in (27) leads to the following expressions for the indi¤erent consumers: 
and L0 = p L = u. As a result, the publisher sets p H to maximize With this price we also observe that AL = 
HL for
1 , where
Taking this into account, if This implies that for s > s 3 A is never active and consumers only visit H or L:
Taking this into account we now determine the linking strategy of the publishers. For s < e s and s > s 1 and for s > e s and s 2 < s < s 3 all A, H and L are active when A links L, and the price and pro…ts are those in (27) and (28) for > b 1 : 30 As before, the integrated publisher does not want to link L. Finally, for s > e s and s s 3 no consumer visits A. As a consequence, the optimal price and pro…ts are those in (19) and (20) if < b 1 , or the ones in (23) and (24) otherwise.
Consider now the linking strategy of the independent publisher. For s s 1 it holds that 
